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Abstract. Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) has been among the most popular re-
search topics of the last decade. While the bootstrapping-based, public key cryptosystems
that follow Gentry’s original design are getting more and more efficient, their performance
is still far from being practical. This lead to several attempts to construct symmetric FHE
schemes that would not be as inefficient as their public key counterparts. Unfortunately,
most such schemes were also based on (randomized) linear transformations, and shown
completely insecure. One such broken scheme was the Matrix Operation for Randomization
and Encryption (MORE). In a recent paper, Hariss, Noura and Samhat propose Enhanced
MORE, which is supposed to improve over MORE’s weaknesses. We analyze Enhanced
MORE, discuss why it does not improve over MORE, and show that it is even less secure
by presenting a highly efficient ciphertext-only decryption attack. We implement the attack
and confirm its correctness.
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1 Introduction
First introduced in 1978 [9], the concept of homomorphic encryption refers to a cryptosystem,
whose decryption algorithm is a homomorphism w.r.t. a binary operation over the ciphertexts and
another one over the plaintexts. If the plaintext space is a suitable group (or a monoid), such as
the group (Zn,+) in the Pailler cryptosystem [8], the homomorphic property enables one to do
computations over encrypted data. This is very useful in several modern applications, mainly in
cloud computing, where the computationally powerful cloud needs to carry out computation over
potentially sensitive data.
In 2009, Gentry demonstrated that it is possible to construct fully homomorphic encryption
(FHE) [4], whose decryption algorithm is essentially a ring homomorphism. This means, that for
any circuit of “reasonable size,” whose gates are the two ring operations, evaluating the circuit
over plaintexts would give the same result as evaluating it over ciphertexts and then decrypting.
While Gentry’s result was a sensation, the cryptosystems [3,1,11] that follow his, so called
bootstrapping design paradigm, suffer from similar efficiency issues: the ciphertext expansion is
very large, and the homomorphic computations too slow for any practical application. There were
several designs that tried to circumvent these issues by dispensing with the bootstrapping in the
symmetric key setting [2,6,13]. To facilitate efficient FHE, they do however resort to using only
linear transformations, a practice which is known to yield very insecure designs. Unsurprisingly,
they were all completely broken [12].
One such symmetric FHE is the Matrix Operation for Randomization and Encryption (MORE) [6],
whose encryption algorithm is essentially a conjugation by a random invertible matrix over an
instance of the RSA ring. MORE came with a security proof, which showed it secure against
ciphertext-only decryption and key recovery attacks, assuming the uniform distribution of the
plaintexts. Such an assumption is of course unrealistic, and MORE was shown completely inse-
cure in most of real-world applications. Recently, Hariss, Noura and Samhat have attempted to
resurrect MORE by proposing Enhanced MORE (EMORE) [5], which adds more key-dependent
transformations around the core of MORE. These are supposed to make the cryptosystem more
secure, and more efficient.
In this work, we analyze EMORE, and we argue that the introduced modifications improve
neither the security, nor the applicability over MORE. On the contrary, we demonstrate that they
decrease the security, by mounting a ciphertext-only decryption attack.
2 Notation, Syntax and Security Model
In this section, we introduce the used notation, define the syntax of symmetric FHE, and define
the attack model.
Notation. We let ZN denote the ring of integers modulo an integer N ∈ N with the usual
operations. For a matrix A ∈ Zm×nN , we let A(i, j) denote the entry in row i and column j, and
let A(i, :) and A(:, j) denote the i-th row and j-th column of A, respectively. We also let A(j)
denote the j-th column of A. Given an implicit dimension n, we let DiagMat(d1, . . . , dn) denote
the diagonal matrix with d1, . . . , dn placed on the diagonal. Given a square matrix A of dimension
n and an integer ` that divides n, we let SubM(A, `, i, j) denote the submatrix Ai,j of A, such that
A =
A1,1 · · · A1,`... . . . ...
A`,1 · · · A`,`
 .
Given an implicit dimension n, we let I denote the identity matrix of dimension n and we let ei
denote the i-th canonical unit vector, i.e. a column vector that has a 1 in i-th entry and zeros
everywhere else. Given a square matrix A of dimension n, we let CharPoly(M)(x) denote the
characteristic polynomial of M in the indeterminate x. Given a polynomial p(x) of degree d, we
let pi denote the coefficient of the i-th power of x, i.e. p(x) =
∑d
i=0 = pi · xi.
Syntax. A symmetric encryption scheme is a triplet Π = (KeyGen, E ,D). The key generator
KeyGen : N → K × P is a randomized algorithm that takes a security parameter λ, and outputs
a secret key K and a public parameter P . The possibly randomized encryption algorithm E :
K × P ×M → C maps a secret key K, a public parameter P and a plaintext M to a ciphertext
C, and the deterministic decryption algorithm D : K×P ×C →M takes a secret key K, a public
parameter P and a ciphertext C, and gives a plaintext M . We silently allow all the domains
to depend on the security parameter, and the plaintext space M and ciphertext space C can
additionally depend on the secret key and the public parameter.
We require perfect correctness, i.e. for any security parameter λ ∈ N, and for all K,P,M ∈
K × P ×M, we require that Pr[D(K,P, E(K,P,M)) = M ] = 1.
Homomorphic property. For the homomorphic property, we use the notion of circuits. We
assume that (M,⊕,⊗) and (C,,) are both commutative rings. A circuit c : Mµ → M maps
a µ-tuple of plaintexts to a single plaintext by applying the binary operations ⊕,⊗ to the inputs
and intermediate results (we can think of the operations as gates).
A transformed circuit Transf(c) : P × Cµ → C is a circuit over the ciphertext space that is
obtained by replacing each application of ⊕ in c by , and doing similarly for ⊗ and . The
transformed circuit additionally takes the public parameter.
We say that a symmetric encryption scheme Π is fully homorphic, if for every λ ∈ N, for every
circuit c :Mµ →M and for all K,P, (M1, . . . ,Mµ) ∈ K × P ×Mµ, we have that
Pr[D(K,P,Transf(c)(P, E(K,P,M1), . . . , E(K,P,Mµ))) 6= c(M1, . . . ,Mµ)] = negl(λ).
Security Model. Since the scheme we study in this paper is based on linear transformations, it
obviously does not resist to any standard attacks, e.g. chosen plaintext decryption attacks. We
therefore work with a very weak security model (in the sense that the task of the adversary is
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very hard). We mount ciphertext-only decryption attacks with the plaintexts being sampled with
a uniform distribution.
More precisely, we consider a security experiment parameterized by λ, which first runs K,P ←
KeyGen(λ), and then gives P to an adversary, and lets him/her to query r ∈ N. Then, the experi-
ment samples r plaintexts uniformly fromM, encrypts each of them, and gives the corresponding
ciphertexts to the adversary. The adversary then wins if it finds all r plaintexts.
3 The MORE and EMORE Constructions
In this Section we first recall MORE, and then describe the scheme EMORE. We discuss what
we see as flaws in the design of EMORE, and then we introduce a simplified version of EMORE,
whose security is equivalent to the original version presented by the authors.
3.1 MORE
The scheme MORE [6] works over an RSA ring, i.e. over ZN with N a product of two large
primes (whose bit-length is determined by the security parameter). The plaintext space of MORE
is M = ZN , the ciphertext space is the matrix space C = Z2×2N , and the key space K is the set
of all invertible matrices in Z2×2N . The encryption algorithm creates a diagonal matrix from the
plaintext and a uniform element of ZN , and conjugates it with the secret key. The result is the
ciphertext. The algorithms of MORE are described in Figure 1.
1: Algorithm KeyGen(λ)
2: Pick primes p(λ), q(λ)
3: N ← p · q
4: K ←$ {A ∈ Z2×2N | A−1 exists}
5: return N,K
6: end Algorithm
1: Algorithm E(K,N,m)
2: u←$ ZN
3: M ← DiagMat(m,u)
4: return K ·M ·K−1
5: end Algorithm
1: Algorithm D(K,N,C)
2: M ← K−1 ·M ·K
3: return M1,1
4: end Algorithm
Fig. 1. The symmetric FHE scheme MORE.
With N as the public parameter, MORE is easily seen to have perfect homomorphic properties.
The authors of MORE proved that when the adversary is restricted to ciphertext-only attacks
and MORE is used with plaintexts that are uniform and independent, then a decryption attack
is equivalent with finding square roots in ZN , which is believed to be hard. Such an assumption
on plaintexts is of course unrealistic, and it was shown that in most realistic settings, even side
channel information about the plaintexts is enough to break MORE.
3.2 Enhanced MORE
The scheme EMORE [5] is supposed to overcome the drawbacks of MORE, according to the au-
thors. We first give a brief, informal description of the original EMORE, as proposed by its authors.
Original EMORE. The original description of EMORE is not very precise. Here we give our
interpretation of this description. EMORE works over ZN with N a product of two large primes.
It is parameterized by three integers `, n and w, with n even. The plaintexts live in Z`N . The key
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space is a set of bit strings of an unspecified length (possibly λ would work). The key generation
is thus a dummy algorithm that just samples a uniform bit string.
The encryption algorithm of EMORE takes a secret key K and a plaintext vector (m1, . . . ,m`).
It consists of the following stages:
1. Key derivation. First, the key K is used to derive three bit strings DKp, DKd and DKs of
23 · 8, 16 · 8 and 23 · 8 bits, respectively. Then, we further derive a pseudorandom permutation
pi of the set {1, . . . , `} using DKp, a collection of w psudorandom n× n matrices K1, . . . ,Kw
from a special set SN,n (defined below) using DKd, and a pseudorandom permutation ∆ of
the set {1, . . . , w} using DKs.
2. Partitioning and permutation. The plaintext vector (m1, . . . ,m`) is permuted by pi to obtain
m¯ = (mpi(1), . . . ,mpi(`)). Then, m¯ is partitioned into H = d`/ne smaller vectors of dimension
n (m¯i1, . . . , m¯
i
n) for 1 ≤ i ≤ H (the last one possibly padded with zero-elements).
3. MORE-like encryption. We construct matrices M i = DiagMat(m¯i1, . . . , m¯
i
n) for 1 ≤ i ≤ H.
Then we compute the conjugate matrices Ci = (K∆(i))−1 ·M i ·K∆(i) for 1 ≤ i ≤ H. We note
that the secret matrix K∆(i) used to encrypt the i-th block of plaintext is selected with the
secret permutation ∆. The final ciphertext is the list of matrices C1, . . . , CH .
The decryption algorithm of the original EMORE is easy to derive. We first go through the same
key derivation stage as in the encryption. Then, we reverse the MORE-like encryption, concatenate
the obtained vectors of dimension n and finally apply the inverse of pi. The encryption algorithm
of EMORE is illustrated in Figure 2.
To derive DKp, DKd and DKs, the authors suggests to use an unspecified hash function. The
pseudorandom permutations are supposed to be generated using a technique proposed by Noura
and Courrouse´ [7], and the collection of special matrices is generated using the streamcipher RC4.
The matrices K1, . . . ,Kw are constructed in a way that facilitates their easy inversion. Each Ki
and its inverse (Ki)−1 have the following structure:
Ki =
(
A A+ I
A− I A
)
(Ki)−1 =
(
A −A− I
−A+ I A
)
where A is an invertible matrix from Z
n
2×n2
N . This is why n is required to be even. It is easy to
verify that if A is invertible, then det(Ki) = 1, and (Ki)−1 · K = I. Generating such a matrix
randomly is equivalent with sampling A from the domain of these matrices defined as
SN,n =
{(
A A+ I
A− I A
) ∣∣∣∣A ∈ Zn2×n2N and invertible} .
Complaints about EMORE. The design of Enhanced MORE contains several flaws and re-
dundancies which limit security and applicability. We enumerate them here.
– Bad key derivation. The key derivation stage of EMORE contains some design choices that
seem arbitrary. For instance, the authors choose to use an unspecified hash function to derive
DKp, DKd and DKs, but opt for RC4 when generating the matrices K
1, . . . ,Kw. We find
it preferable to keep both components unspecified and treat them as parameters of EMORE
(especially since RC4 is known to be biased). Beside this, the sizes of DKp, DKd and DKs
are inexplicably fixed, while the number of keys w and the dimension n are left as parameters.
This limits the effective security of EMORE, regardless of the security parameter.
– Limited usefulness of the homomorphic properties. The homomorphic properties of MORE
encryption scheme are based on the fact, that all ciphertexts are a diagonal matrices conjugated
with the same key matrix; this is why the multiplication and addition of ciphertexts is preserved
by the decryption.
However in EMORE, any two plaintext sub-vectors m¯i, m¯j with i 6= j get encrypted with
two independent matrices K∆(i),K∆(j). Thus it will be impossible to do any homomorphic
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Fig. 2. The encryption algorithm of the Enhance MORE (the original version). Picture taken from the
original paper [5].
computations that involve both m¯i and m¯j , unless m¯j is included in another plaintext vector
on the position i or vice-versa. With ` > n, EMORE is thus something like H = d`/ne parallel
instances of a smaller symmetric FHE. Moreover, all of them can only execute the same
circuit when doing the homomorphic computations.
– Useless key components. The key selection by the permutation ∆ is completely useless. As-
suming the matrices K1, . . . ,Kw are uniformly sampled from SN,n, it is equivalent to simply
sample H key matrices, and use them without permutation.
The initial permutation pi is also of limited use. We demonstrate that given a matrix Ci and
N , it is possible to extract the underlying plaintext sub-vector (m¯i1, . . . , m¯
i
n), regardless of pi,
It is debatable whether the fact that they are shuﬄed has any security benefits.
Simplified EMORE. Based on our critique of EMORE, we define simplified EMORE (sE-
MORE). In sEMORE, we work with plaintext vectors from ZnN , so there is no partitioning of
plaintexts. We also dispense with the permutation pi. Because the plaintexts are now treated as
monolythic vectors, we also use just a single key matrix. We treat the dimension n as an implicit
parameter of the scheme. The algorithms of sEMORE are defined in Figure 3.
1: Algorithm KeyGen(λ,n)
2: Pick primes p(λ), q(λ)
3: N ← p · q
4: K ←$ SN,n
5: return N,K
6: end Algorithm
1: Algorithm E(K,N, (m1, . . . ,mn))
2: M ← DiagMat(m1, . . . ,mn)
3: return K−1 ·M ·K
4: end Algorithm
1: Algorithm D(K,N,C)
2: M ← K ·M ·K−1
3: return (M1,1, . . . ,Mn,n
4: end Algorithm
Fig. 3. The symmetric FHE scheme simplified EMORE.
A decryption attack on sEMORE will easily translate to EMORE. We describe such an attack
in the next section.
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4 Decryption Attack on sEMORE
In this section, we analyze the security of sEMORE. Contrary to their intentions, the authors of
EMORE have not improved, but decreased security of their construction compared to MORE. In
MORE, a ciphertext-only attack in a setting with uniform plaintexts was not possible. Here, we
show that sEMORE (and thus also EMORE) succumb to a single-ciphertext decryption attack in
just such a setting.
Formally, we mount an attack in the model described in Section 2, using a single ciphertext C.
Redundant structure. We first exploit the known structure of the key matrix K to obtain some
information about the underlying plaintext vector (m1, . . . ,mn). We note that (m1, . . . ,mn) are
eigenvalues of C.
We do not know A, but we know that the eigenvector of C associated to mi is of the form(
A(i)
−A(i) + ei
)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n
2
and
(−A(i− n/2)− ei−n/2
A(i− n/2)
)
for
n
2
< i ≤ n.
Setting Ci,j = SubM(C, 2, i, j) for i, j ∈ {1, 2}, we then deduce the following equalities for 1 ≤ i ≤
n/2 and n/2 < j ≤ n:(
C1,1 C1,2
C2,1 C2,2
)
·
(
A(i)
−A(i) + ei
)
= mi ·
(
A(i)
−A(i) + ei
)
(4.1)(
C1,1 C1,2
C2,1 C2,2
)
·
(−A(j − n/2)− ej−n/2
A(j − n/2)
)
= mj ·
(−A(j − n/2)− ej−n/2
A(j − n/2)
)
. (4.2)
After evaluating the matrix multiplication on the left side, the equality (4.1) will yield (4.3)
and (4.4), and the equality (4.2) will yield (4.5) and (4.6):
(C1,1 − C1,2)·A(i) + C1,2 · ei = mi ·A(i) (4.3)
(C2,1 − C2,2)·A(i) + C2,2 · ei = −mi ·A(i) +mi · ei (4.4)
(−C1,1 + C1,2)·A(j − n/2)− C1,1 · ej−n/2 = −mj ·A(j − n/2)−mj · ej−n/2 (4.5)
(−C2,1 + C2,2)·A(j − n/2)− C2,1 · ej−n/2 = mj ·A(j − n/2). (4.6)
We next compute a sum of (4.3) and (4.4), obtaining (4.7), and the sum of (4.5) and (4.6) that
will yield (4.8):
(C1,1 − C1,2 + C2,1 − C2,2)·A(i) + (C1,2 + C2,2) · ei = mi · ei (4.7)
(−C1,1 + C1,2 − C2,1 + C2,2)·A(j − n/2)− (C1,1 + C2,1) · ej−n/2 = −mj · ej−n/2. (4.8)
We now set j = i+ n/2 and sum the equalities (4.7) and (4.8):
(−C1,1 + C1,2 − C2,1 + C2,2) · ei = (mi −mi+n/2) · ei. (4.9)
Let D = (−C1,1 +C1,2 −C2,1 +C2,2). We see that for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2, the i-th column of D is
the i-th canonical unit vector, multiplied by a difference of two eigenvalues of C. Thus the matrix
D, which can be computed using only the ciphertext, is a diagonal matrix, whose entries on the
diagonal leak differences of eigenvalues of C. This can be used to circumvent the computation of
roots in ZN , and to extract the eigenvalues easily.
Extracting the plaintext vector. Let δi = D(i, i) denote the i-th entry on the diagonal of D.
We consider the characteristic polynomial p(x) = CharPoly(C)(x) of the ciphertext C. Note that
the roots of p(x) are the elements of the plaintext vector m. We define n new polynomials p−i(x)
and pi(x) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2 as p−i(x) = p(x− δi) and pi(x) = p(x+ δi).
For any 1 ≤ i ≤ n/2,mi must be a root of p−i(x). Thusmi will also be a root of gcd(p(x), p−i(x)).
If there are no (j, k) 6= (i, i+ n/2) for which mj −mk = δi, then p(x) and p−i(x) can only have a
single root in common, and gcd(p(x), p−i(x)) will be of degree one, allowing to compute mi easily.
Similar applies with pi(x) and mi+n/2.
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1: Algorithm DecAttack(N,C)
2: D ← (−C1,1 + C1,2 − C2,1 + C2,2)
3: p(x) = CharPoly(C)
4: for i← 1 to n/2 do
5: p−i(x) = p(x−D(i, i)); pi(x) = p(x+D(i, i))
6: q(x)← gcd(p(x), p−i(x)); q′(x)← gcd(p(x), pi(x))
7: if gcd computation failed due to bad division then
8: return factors of N
9: else if deg(q(x)) > 1 or deg(q′(x)) > 1 then
10: abort
11: end if
12: mi ← −q0/q1; mi+n/2 ← −q′0/q′1
13: if division failed then
14: return factors of N
15: end if
16: end for
17: return (m1, . . . ,mn)
18: end Algorithm
Fig. 4. Decryption attack on the symmetric FHE scheme sEMORE.
This allows us to mount the decryption attack described in Figure 4. We give a toy example
of the attack in Section A.
Complexity and success probability. The complexity of the attack is dominated by the iterated
computation of the gcd of two polynomials over ZN of degree n, so the complexity is bounded by
O(n3 · log(N)2) binary operations.
The attack can abort due to two reasons. Either there is a division by an integer that is not
coprime with N , or one of the computed polynomials q(x) or q′(x) has a degree higher than
one. In the former case, we succeed, because after factoring N , computing the eigenvalues of any
ciphertext will become easy thanks to the Chinese remainder theorem.
If the plaintexts are indeed distributed uniformly (or else with a high min-entropy), the latter
reason for an abort is highly unlikely. More precisely, the probability that the attack fails is at most
the probability that there exist 1 ≤ i, j, ` ≤ n such that (i, i+ n/2) 6= (j, `) and (mi −mi+n/2) =
(mj−m`). Under the mild assumption that all plaintext components mi are distributed identically
and independently, the probability of such a collision with fixed i, j, ` is at most pmax, Thus,
the probability that any such i, j, k exist is (rather loosely) upper bounded by n3 · pmax, where
pmax = maxµ Pr[mi = µ]. The probability of success of this attack is then at least 1− n3 · pmax.
We can generalize the attack by requesting several ciphertexts C1, . . . , Cr at the beginning of
the experiment, and applying the attack from Figure 4 to each Ci independently. If we succeed
for at least one of the ciphertexts Ci, the knowledge of the eigenvalues of Ci lets us compute K,
which in turn allows us to decrypt all remaining ciphertexts.
The success probability of the generalized attack is at least 1 − (n3 · pmax)r. In order for this
strategy to succeed with a probability of at least 1/2, we must have | log(pmax)| > 3 log(n) and we
would have to use
r ≥ − log(2)
3 log(n) + log(pmax)
If the distribution of plaintexts is such that the probability pmax is high, this estimation becomes
meaningless.
4.1 Attacking EMORE with High pmax.
If pmax is high, EMORE will not offer any meaningful security, as we will be able to easily verify
whether a ciphertext C’s underlying plaintext matrix contains any plaintext element µ that is very
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likely to occur by checking if p(µ) = 0 for p(x) = CharPoly(C). This observation can be used to
extend the attack from Figure 4 and increase its success probability if pmax is high, at the cost of
increased computational complexity.
More precisely, we select a positive constant k for which the set Mhi = {µ ∈ ZN |Pr[mi =
µ] ≥ 1/k · n3} will be non-empty. Instead of simply aborting if the condition on line 9 of Figure 4
evaluates as true, we iterate through all µ ∈Mhi, and for each µ check if it is a root of either the
current q(x) or the current q′(x), which would imply that µ is one of the plaintext elements. For
each such µ we further check whether p(µ −D(i, i)) = 0 (respectively p(µ + D(i, i)) = 0), which
would further imply that µ −D(i, i) (respectively µ + D(i, i)) is also among the plaintext-vector
elements. We store all thus identified distinct plaintext elements. At the end of the main loop, we
keep dividing the characteristic polynomial p(x) by monomials constructed using the identified
plaintext elements, and abort only if we cannot completely decompose p(x).
Complexity and success probability. The complexity of the attack is now increased. In the
worst case, each of the n/2 iterations of the main loop consists of computing the polynomial
GCDs, and iterating over all elements ofMhi. Each iteration of the inner loop is dominated by the
evaluation of two polynomials of degree no greater than n in some value. As we have |Mhi| ≤ k ·n3
by definition, the worst case complexity of the extended attack is
n/2 · (n2 ·O(log(N)2) + k · n3 · n ·O(log(N)2))) = O(k · n5 · log(N)2).
To analyze the probability of success of the extended attack, we first note that we surely succeed
if, for every i = 1, . . . , n/2, in the ith iteration of the main loop, either deg(gcd(q(x), q′(x))) = 1,
or else if we have mi = µ and mi+n/2 = µ−D(i, i) (respectively mi+n/2 = µ and mi = µ+D(i, i))
for one of the values µ ∈Mhi (then we will surely have q(µ) = 0 and p(µ−D(i, i)) = 0 or q′(µ) = 0
and p(µ+D(i, i)) = 0).
We let E(i, j, `) denote the event ∃(j, `) 6= (i, i+ n/2) : D(i, i) = mj −m`, and let F(i) denote
the event (mi /∈ Mhi) ∧ (mi+n/2 /∈ Mhi). By using the union bound on the iterations of the main
loop, we get
Pr[success] ≥1− n · Pr[E(i, j, `) ∧ F(i)]
≥1− n · Pr[E(i, j, `)|F(i)] · Pr[F(i)]
≥1− n ·
 ∑
(j,`)6=(i,i+n/2)
∑
µ∈ZN
Pr[mi = mj −m` + µ|F(i)] · Pr[mi+n/2 = µ|F(i)]
 · Pr[F(i)]
≥1− n ·
n2 · 1
k · n3 ·
∑
µ∈ZN
Pr[mi+n/2 = µ|F(i)]

≥1− 1
k
.
The extended attack works with any k for whichMhi is non-empty, and we can use the parameter
k to fine-tune the trade-off between the complexity and success probability.
We further see that the worst-case complexity of the extended attack becomes practical when
pmax ≈ 1/n3 or higher, which is exactly where the loose estimation of the attack described in
Figure 4 falls off Thus sEMORE yields to a ciphertext-only decryption attack under any possible
circumstances.
4.2 Experimental Verification
We implemented the attack in the SAGE mathematical software [10], to verify its correctness.
We conducted all experiments using a sEMORE instance with a random 2048-bit modulus and
n = 16.
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When the messages are uniform in ZM , the attack practically always succeeds, as expected.
We tested this with 27 independent iterations of the attack, and all of them succeeded.
We further investigated the success rate of the simple attack with low-entropy distributions,
for which the loose lower bound on the success probability is meaningless. We carried out two sets
of experimental measurements, each set with a different type of distribution of the plaintext. In
the first set, we sampled each plaintext element using a uniform distribution over a subset of ZN
of varying size. In the second set, we used a rounded Gaussian distribution with varying parameter
σ. The results of the measurements are depicted in Figure 5. We can see that the lower bound
of the success probability is indeed too restrictive, as the basic attack does succeed with non-zero
probability initially, but the success probability quickly drops as pmax increases.
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Fig. 5. The empirically measured success probability of the attack from Figure 4, compared to the pre-
dicted lower bound for an instance of sEMORE with a 2048-bit modulus, n = 16, and plaintext elements
distributed uniformly in a subset of ZN (left) or according to a rounded Gaussian distribution (right).
Here pmax = maxµ∈ZN (Pr[mi = µ]).
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Fig. 6. The empirically measured success probability of the extended attack described in Section 4.1,
compared to the predicted lower bound for an instance of sEMORE with a 2048-bit modulus, n = 16, and
plaintext elements distributed uniformly in a subset of ZN . Here pmax = maxµ∈ZN (Pr[mi = µ]).
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We also implemented the extended attack, and empirically measured it success probability on
an instance of sEMORE with 2048-bit modulus, n = 16, and plaintexts distributed uniformly
in subsets of ZN of varying size. In the attack, we set k = 1, so the set Mhi always covered all
elements of ZN that occurred with non-zero probability. The results of the measurements can be
found in Figure 6.
We see, that in the interval of pmax, in which the basic attack stops being efficient, the extended
attack already works flawlessly. This further confirms our assertion, that sEMORE and EMORE
are completely broken.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze the security of Enhanced MORE, a reincarnation of the MORE symmetric
FHE scheme. Even though MORE was badly broken, the authors of EMORE not only reused the
linear encryption method, but introduced additional vulnerabilities. We make this explicit, by
mounting a decryption attack. We believe it important to demonstrate concrete, and precisely
described attacks on weak schemes like EMORE, so that their propagation in the literature, and
their potential use in practice is limited.
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A Toy Example of the Attack
In this section, we define a toy instance of the simplified Enhanced MORE encryption scheme,
and mount the attack described in Figure 4.
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We let p = 11 and q = 13, so we have N = 143. We set the dimension of plaintext space
to n = 4. We next run the key generation algorithm, sample a random invertible matrix A, and
compute K, obtaining:
A =
(
92 45
92 62
)
and K =
(
A A+ I
A− I A
)
=

92 45 93 45
92 62 92 63
91 45 92 45
92 61 92 62
 .
Then we sample a uniform plaintext vector from Z143, and place it on the diagonal of a matrix
M . We run the encryption C = E(K,N,M). We have:
M =

32 0 0 0
0 52 0 0
0 0 36 0
0 0 0 25
 and C =

25 74 50 2
43 23 104 99
72 32 43 104
10 103 92 54
 .
We now compute the matrix D that will leak the differences of the plaintext values. For this, we
first partition the ciphertext C into four submatrices:
C1,1 =
(
25 74
43 23
)
C1,2 =
(
50 2
104 99
)
C2,1 =
(
72 32
10 103
)
C2,2 =
(
43 104
92 54
)
.
Using these, we compute the matrix D, using the formula D = (−C1,1 + C1,2 − C2,1 + C2,2):
D =
(
139 0
0 27
)
.
Next, we compute the characteristic polynomial p(x) of C:
p(x) = x4 + 141 · x3 + 109 · x2 + 73 · x+ 104
Using the diagonal entries of D, we compute the polynomials p−i(x) = p(x−D(i, i)) and pi(x) =
p(x + D(i, i)) for i ∈ {1, 2}. For each i, we then compute q(x) = gcd(p−i(x), p(x)) and q′(x) =
gcd(pi(x), p(x)). These will be polynomials of degree one, that will allow us to recover mi as
−q0 · q−11 and mi+2 as −q′0 · q′1−1. We follow through the computation for i = 1:
p−1(x) = x4 + 14 · x3 + 38 · x2 + 104 · x+ 123, and we have q(x) = 14 · x+ 124
and
p1(x) = x
4 + 125 · x3 + 86 · x2 + 136 · x+ 81, and we have q′(x) = 129 · x+ 75.
We can verify that
M(1, 1) = 32 ≡ −124 · 14−1 (mod 143)
and
M(3, 3) = 36 ≡ −75 · 129−1 (mod 143).
For i = 2, we have
p−2(x) = x4 + 33 · x3 + 69 · x2 + 27 · x+ 39, and we have q(x) = 36 · x+ 130
and
p2(x) = x
4 + 106 · x3 + 31 · x2 + 94 · x+ 38, and we have q′(x) = 107 · x+ 42.
We can verify that
M(2, 2) = 52 ≡ −130 · 36−1 (mod 143)
and
M(4, 4) = 25 ≡ −42 · 107−1 (mod 143).
Thus the attack successfully recovered all entries of the plaintext vector.
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